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Liberty and Marriage -
Baehr and Beyond: Due Process in 1998 
Lynne Marie Kohm* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
When John Stuart Mill wrote his treatise on liberty, he had in mind a 
sense of justice, fairness and equality.' Likewise, the founding fathers con-
templated freedom, justice, and the inalienability of certain God-given 
rights when they penned the Declaration of Independence.2 When the Su-
preme Court of the United States reviewed the concept of liberty in the 
context of marriage, it determined that such liberty extends to the funda-
mental right to marriage, regardless of race. Loving v. Virginia determined 
* Copyright © 1998 by Lynn Marie Kohm. Assistant Professor, Regent University School 
of Law; B.A. 1980, Albany University; J.D. 1988, Syracuse University. This text was originally 
delivered in November, 1997 at Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty 
Years, at the Catholic University of America, co-sponsored by the Columbus School of Law, Howard 
University School of Law, and the J. Reuben Clark School of Law at Brigham Young University. 
Much gratitude and appreciation are expressed to David Coolidge for his foresight regarding the 
need for this conference, Robert Destro for hosting it, and Duke Dorotheo for his long hours in 
making it happen. I am thankful for the work of Shannon Woodruff and John Tuskey, staff attorneys 
for the American Center for Law and Justice, who through their written work and oral briefings were 
of great assistance in putting together this analysis. Likewise, it has been a pleasure to work with 
Brigham Young University, Howard University and Catholic University as part of a symposium that 
truly reflects the eternal family (Romans 10:12). Many thanks to the staff at THE BYU JOURNAL OF 
PUBLIC LAW for their timeliness and professionalism in publishing this segment of the conference 
presentations. 
This article is dedicated to my family, with whom it is a privilege to serve on the same team. 
Thanks to my husband, Joseph, for making it a joy to work together to build better children for our 
future, rather than wait for a better future for our children. Bo and Kathleen, with all my love and 
support, heaven is counting on you. 
I. See generally JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY, (reprinted 1975, from the original in 
1859). The work of enlightenment philosophers formed the basis for the American concept of liberty. 
Nonetheless, they have also been the basis for post modern American liberalism. See GERTRUDE 
H!MMELFARB, ON LIBERTY AND LIBERALISM: THE CASE OF JOHN STUART MILL (1974) (discussing 
Mill's balancing of liberty, freedom of action and individuality with fundamental principles of stable 
social unions); GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, ON LoOKING INTO THE ABYSS: UNTIMELY THOUGHTS ON 
CULTURE AND SociETY 103 (1994) (suggesting that post modem liberalism of our culture is seduced 
by the individual's independence as a matter of right lacking the necessity of social balance, which 
Mill also promoted). See also JOHN STUART MILL, THE SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 427 (World's Classics 
ed. 1912) (1869) (stating Mill's claim that social relations between the sexes ought to be replaced 
by a principle of perfect equality). 
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776). 
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that liberty necessitated the invalidation of state laws proscribing and pun-
ishing interracial marriage on due process grounds. 3 
Richard Loving, a white man, and Mildred Jetter, a black woman, both 
residents of Virginia, were married in the District of Columbia and re-
turned to their home state to live.4 They were charged and convicted by the 
Commonwealth of Virginia of violating Virginia's miscegenation statutes 
banning interracial marriage.5 Their one-year jail sentences were sus-
pended on the condition that they not return to Virginia for twenty five 
years, and they promptly moved to Washington, D.C.6 In the midst of the 
civil rights movement of the 1960s they appealed these convictions, and 
the United States Supreme Court heard their case.7 Holding that liberty and 
freedom to marry is indeed a fundamental right, the Court ruled that Vir-
ginia's statute was an unconstitutional denial of liberty.8 The Court ob-
served: 
We have consistently denied the constitutionality of 
measures which restrict the rights of citizens on ac-
count of race .... 
These statutes . . . deprive the Lovings of liberty 
without due process of law in violation of the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The free-
dom to marry has long been recognized as one of the 
vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of 
happiness by free men.9 
The current question is whether that same liberty is extended to mar-
riage regardless of the parties' genders. Thirty years after the Loving deci-
sion, the same legal arguments are being used to expand the fundamental 
right to marriage to include same-sex couples. These arguments rest on 
equal protection rationale, namely, discrimination based on gender. 10 This 
article will review the due process argument offered in the context of 
same-sex marriage. 
3. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). 
4. !d. at 2. 
5. /d. 
6. /d. Mildred preferred the opportunity to live near her family, and wrote to President 
Kennedy, asking for his assistance. The Justice Department took the case. Robert A. Pratt, The 
Drama of Loving, Address at the Law and the Politics of Marriage: Loving v. Virginia After Thirty 
Years, How. L.J. (forthcoming Spring 1998). 
7. Loving, 388 U.S. at 2. 
8. !d. at 10-14. 
9. !d. at 11-12. 
10. See Richard Duncan, Loving, Homosexual Marriage and Moral Discernment, 12 BYU 
J. PUB. L. 239 (1998). 
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Since liberty is inherent in any due process argument, the debate over 
same-sex marriage has spawned the following questions: What is meant by 
liberty in the context of state-sanctioned marriage today? What is meant by 
a right to marriage as a substantive due process right today? Or how 
broadly are courts to construe the substantive due process right to mar-
riage? 
These questions can only be answered with a thorough analysis of the 
Supreme Court's treatment of liberty and marriage in Loving, recent schol-
arship, and judicial treatment of liberty and due process in a current consti-
tutional context. Others have clearly examined and explained the concept 
of marriage as a fundamental right. 11 We need to discuss what that means 
in 1998, particularly in light of the cases that are pending in courts across 
the nation. This article offers answers to these questions. It will also begin 
the discussion of how we can expect the Supreme Court to treat this issue 
in the future. 
To fully understand this discussion, remember that there is no Family 
Law in the national, unified sense. Family law springs from several 
sources: the common law, state constitutional law and statutory law, fed-
eral administrative and regulatory law, and federal constitutional law. 12 
The fifty states have their own sovereign rules on the subject, and individ-
ual state legislatures legislate many important family law relationships.13 
Marriage is an institution that is generally and routinely regulated by state 
statute, because of the state's important nexus with the family unit and the 
general welfare of its citizens. 14 As the United States Supreme Court has 
stated: 
Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, 
as having more to do with the morals and civilization of a peo-
ple than any other institution, has always been subject to the 
control of the legislature. That body prescribes the age at 
which the parties may contract to marry, the procedure or 
form essential to constitute marriage, the duties and obliga-
II. See, e.g., Lynn D. Wardle, The Meaning of Loving: Liberty and Marriage, How. L. 1. 
(forthcoming Spring 1998) [hereinafter The Meaning of Loving); and Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical 
Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-Sex Marriage, 1996 BYU L. REV. I [hereinafter A 
Critical Analysis]. 
12. JOHN DEWrrr GREGORY, PETER N. SWISHER, SHERYL L. SCHEIBLE-WOLF, UNDERSTANDING 
FAMILY LAw 1-3, 12-13 (1997) (adding to this list the role of the legal practitioner in shaping family 
law). 
13. /d. at 12. 
14. /d. at 2. See also Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("The whole subject of 
the domestic relations of husband and wife ... belongs to the laws of the State, and not the laws 
of the United States."). 
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tions it creates, its effects upon the property rights of both ... 
and the acts which may constitute grounds for its dissolution.15 
As Loving indicates, however, since marriage is a fundamental right sub-
ject to constitutional protection, a state cannot prohibit the exercise of this 
liberty in violation of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 16 
Section II will examine the procedural posture of pending due process 
claims regarding marriage. Many of these cases are actually awaiting the 
final decision of the Hawaii judiciary in Baehr v. Miike. 17 Section ill will 
discuss the meaning and parameters of substantive due process at the end 
of 1997 in the context of the most current United States Supreme Court 
decision on the Due Process Clause. Section IV will address whether a 
fundamental right to same-sex marriage exists. In that context the article 
will discuss whether these standards require the recognition of a new fun-
damental right, or dictate that one already exists which is infringed upon 
by state prohibition. Section V will outline what is necessary to support the 
recognition of a new fundamental right and gives the strengths and weak-
nesses of the arguments and their analysis. Finally, section VI will con-
clude with a likely prospectus on the issue of liberty and due process in 
same-sex marriage claims, should such a claim ever reach the United 
States Supreme Court. 
II. CURRENT STATE OF DUE PROCESS CLAIMS IN MARRIAGE 
Under the Due Process Clause, people who are married or are inter-
ested in being joined in marriage have a constitutional liberty interest that 
must be recognized when state proceedings are instituted against them. 18 
This is what happened in Loving. It is another matter to discern whether 
individuals interested in being joined in state sanctioned marriage have a 
constitutional liberty interest that must be recognized when they seek state 
15. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888). 
16. Loving, 388 U.S. I. 
17. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993), reconsideration granted in part by Baehr v. 
Lewin, 875 P.2d 225, appeal after remand, Baehr v. Miike, 910 P.2d 112 (Haw. 1996), on remand 
to Baehr v. Miike, No. CIV. 91-1394, 1996 WL 694235 (Haw. Cir. Ct. 1996). 
18. See also Joe A. Tucker, Assimilation to the United States: A Study of the Adjustment of 
Status and the Immigration Marriage Fraud Statutes, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 20, 83 (1989). 
Professor Tucker examines the constitutional due process implications for denial of hearing to 
resident aliens and their unadmitted spouses, stating that citizens and permanent residents may have 
the fundamental right to marry and associate with the mate of their choice without forfeiting 
residence in the United States. /d. 
The situation presented by same-sex marriage arguments is neither analogous, nor similar, due 
to the fact that there is no state intervention in these relationships, but same sex couples are seeking 
to achieve state intervention in the recognition of their relationships. This comparison leads to the 
necessary discussion regarding what is needed to establish a new fundamental right. See Section V. 
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intervention to establish that they are entitled to such a right. This is the 
situation presented in Baehr. It is an altogether different matter when par-
ties request state intervention, seeking to be afforded those rights, than the 
situation in Loving, where the state interfered in these fundamental rela-
tionships. 19 This request for state intervention is not contemplated in due 
process; rather, the clause protects an individual from state intervention. 
Many same-sex marriage proponents confuse the two concepts and lump 
them all under due process protection. 20 Due process does not require 
states to sanction certain relationships, nor was substantive due process 
meant to deprive states of their rights to enact statutes reflecting that state's 
standard of conduct. 
In cases pending, plaintiffs implore the state to establish this liberty on 
their behalf, arguing they have a fundamental right to such liberty. The 
central case of course is Baehr v. Miike. 21 When Ninia Baehr and Genora 
Dancel were denied an application for a marriage license in Hawaii, they, 
along with two other couples, brought their claim to court, suing on 
grounds that requiring parties to a marriage to be of different sexes was 
sex discrimination under the Hawaii State Constitution and was a denial of 
19. In his article, Professor Robert Pratt explains that the Lovings were actually arrested in 
their own bedroom one night when the Caroline County Sheriff and his deputies let themselves into 
the Loving home to make the arrest for violation of the Virginia statute. (A more explicit example 
of state intervention I cannot imagine.) Robert A. Pratt, The Drama of Loving: An Interracial Couple 
Meets the Courts, How. L. J. (forthcoming Spring 1998). 
20. See Deborah M. Henson, Will Same-sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?: Full 
Faith and Credit and Due Process Limitations on States Choice of Law Regarding the Status and 
Incidents of Homosexual Marriages Following Hawaii's Baehr v. Lewin, 32 J. FAM. L. 551 (1993-
94) [hereinafter Will Same-sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?]. Henson uses Roe v. 
Wade to demonstrate personal liberty and restrictions upon state action. /d. at 593 (quoting Roe v. 
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973)). Principles of substantive due process as protective of personal 
privacy do require freedom from state interference in intimate relationships, as in Loving. Due 
process protects one from governmental intrusion. Substantive due process, however, does not require 
states to sanctify relationships. Furthermore, Henson takes issue with the Court's decision in Bowers 
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), stating that deciding cases based on majoritarian morality is 
specious at best. Henson, Will Same-sex Marriages Be Recognized in Sister States?, 32 J. FAM. L. 
551, 595 (1993-94). On the contrary, Bowers is a mandate to limit the reach of substantive due 
process in the protection of private conduct. Conduct inherent in homosexual relationships (and thus 
in same-sex marriage) is not deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition, and the Bowers 
holding clarifies that no constitutional right to homosexual sodomy exists. 478 U.S. at 194. To twist 
substantive due process to afford protection to such conduct in a state sanctified marriage is to pull 
due process rationale out from under its judicial legacy. Lynn Wardle further clarifies the importance 
of the precedent in Bowers in his definitive article, A Critical Analysis, supra note II, at 34-44. In 
the context of privacy and Bowers he states, 
[t]he notion of a right to same-sex marriage ... is unsupported by the principle of a 
zone of ... sexual privacy. If privacy protects consenting adult sexual behavior, such 
behavior, under zone of privacy analysis, is also beyond the reach of government to 
endorse. Thus, the zone of privacy doctrine does not justify legalization of same-sex 
marriage. 
/d. at 44 (quoting Bowers, 478 U.S. at 203). 
21. 1996 WL 694235. For the case history, see supra note 17 and David Orgon Coolidge, 
Playing the Loving Card: Same-sex Marriage and the Politics of Analogy, 12 BYU J. PUB. L. 201. 
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a fundamental right in violation of due process, equal protection and pri-
vacy.22 The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled that the couples could marry un-
less the State of Hawaii could show a compelling state interest in denying 
the plaintiffs the right to marry.23 Upon reconsideration and appeal, the 
court appointed a commission to study the issue. 24 
Storrs v. Holcomb15 is a New York case involving two gay men who 
applied for a marriage license in 1995. The court stated that there need be 
only a rational relation between a similar classification and a legitimate 
state purpose. 26 The rational relationship test is the lowest level of due pro-
cess scrutiny and is applied in the absence of a fundamental right. 
Callender v. Corbetf1 is a pending same-sex marriage case in Arizona, 
where the same-sex plaintiffs have announced they would not appeal but 
would await the outcome of the pending Baehr case.28 
Among the cases that have been decided previously are Dean v. Dis-
trict of Columbia,19 Baker v. Nelson, 30 Jones v. Hallahan, 31 and Singer v. 
Hara?1 Contending that the denial of a marriage license violated their fun-
22. Baehr, 852 P.2d at 44. 
23. !d. at 60. In a concurring opinion, Chief Judge Bums of the Intermediate Court of 
Appeals, sitting in place of Chief Justice Lum who was recused, instructed the plaintiffs to prove 
that homosexuality was biologically fated. /d. at 69-70. The dissenting opinion of Justices Heen and 
Hayashi asserts that the Baehr majority sought to "manufacture a civil right which is unsupported 
by any precedent." /d. at 74. For a thorough treatment of the inherent contradiction in the opinions, 
see Lynne Marie Kohm, A Reply to "Principles and Prejudice": Marriage and the Realization that 
Principles Win Over Political Will, 22 J. CONTEMP. L. 293 (1996). See also Coolidge, supra note 
21. 
24. 875 P.2d 225. During this period of time, the Hawaii legislature passed HAW. REv. STAT. 
§ 572-1 (1994), to be confurned by referendum of the people in November of 1998. 
25. 645 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1996). 
26. /d. (relying on In re Cooper, 592 N.Y.S.2d 797 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993)). 
27. No. 196666 (Ariz. Super. Ct. filed Apr. 13, 1994). 
28. Same-Sex Couples Drop Lawsuit, May Rejile Marriage Case After Similar Hawaii Trial 
is Resolved, ARiz. REPUBLIC, May 22, 1994, at B3. Additionally, a same-sex marriage case was filed 
in Alaska Superior Court entitled Brauser v. Bureau of Affairs, as well as a case in Vermont titled 
Baker v. Vermont, but these cases are as yet unreported. 
29. 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995) (holding (l) District of Columbia marriage statute prohibited 
clerk from issuing marriage license to same sex couples; (2) clerk did not unlawfully discriminate 
against plaintiffs under District of Columbia Human Rights Act by refusing to issue them marriage 
license; and (3) same sex marriage was not fundamental right protected by Due Process Clause). 
30. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971) (holding that statute governing marriage does not authorize 
marriage between persons of the same sex, such marriages are accordingly prohibited, and that such 
statute does not offend the First, Eighth, Ninth or Fourteenth Amendments of the United States 
Constitution), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 810 (1972) (dismissing appeal for want of substantial 
federal question). 
31. 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973). The court summarily dismissed the appellants' 
claims, as "[m]arriage was a custom long before the state commenced to issue licenses for that 
purpose." ld. at 589. They added that the relationship proposed by these petitioners does not 
authorize the issuance of a marriage license because what they propose is not a marriage. ld. at 590. 
32. 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage 
did not violate constitutional provision that equality of rights and responsibility under the law shall 
not be denied or abridged on account of sex). The conclusions in Singer were similar to those 
reached in Jones. 
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damental rights, the petitioners in Baker relied, as do petitioners in Baehr, 
on Loving v. Virginia. 33 The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected these ar-
guments: 
Loving does indicate that not all state restrictions upon the 
right to marry are beyond reach of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. But in commonsense [sic) and in a constitutional sense, 
there is a clear distinction between a marital restriction based 
merely upon race and one based upon the fundamental differ-
ence in sex. 34 
The Minnesota Supreme Court declared that the Due Process Clause is not 
a charter for restructuring marriage by judiciallegislation.35 Because mar-
riage is an institution based on the nation's deeply rooted history and tradi-
tion, an asserted contemporary concept of marriage could not expand the 
reach of a fundamental rights interest. 36 
A three-judge panel in Dean unanimously arrived at the conclusion 
that the Due Process Clause does not protect a fundamental right for same-
sex marriage. 37 The Baehr ruling reviewed the due process and equal pro-
tection claims, finding that an abridgment of the right based on sex or sex-
ual orientation could, in fact, be afforded heightened or strict scrutiny, at 
least under Hawaii constitutional law.38 The other forty-nine states have 
not found any state or federal constitutional right to same-sex mar-
33. 388 U.S. I (1967). 
34. 191 N.W.2d at 187. 
35. /d. at 186. 
36. /d. The court supported its conclusion by stating that marriage is "deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition." Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
37. 653 A.2d 307, 331 (D.C. 1995). Professor William N. Eskridge, Jr., of Georgetown 
University Law School, a prominent gay rights proponent, argued the case for the appellants, with 
plaintiff Craig Dean as co-counsel on the brief. See D.C. Court of Appeals Rejects Gay Marriage 
Appeal, LESBIAN/GAY LAw NOTES 13, 14 (Arthur Leonard ed.) (Feb. 1995). 
38. 852 P.2d 44, 68 (Haw. 1993). The Hawaii State Constitution explicitly prohibits 
discrimination based on "sex." HAW. CON ST. art. I. In the original ruling, Justices Heen and Hayashi 
joined in a dissenting opinion that clearly stated why a prohibition on same-sex marriage did not 
violate the Hawaii Constitution. 
[These same-sex couples] complain that because they are not allowed to legalize their 
relationships, they are denied a multitude of statutory benefits conferred upon spouses in 
a legal marriage. . . . Those benefits can be conferred without rooting out the very 
essence of a legal marriage. This Court should not manufacture a civil right which is 
unsupported by any precedent, and whose legal incidents-the entitlement to those 
statutory benefits-will reach beyond the right to enter into legal marriage and overturn 
long standing public policy encompassing other areas of public concern. This decision will 
have far-reaching and grave repercussions on the finances and policies of the governments 
and industry of this state and all the other states in the country. 
/d. at 74 (footnote omitted) (Heen, J., dissenting). 
The Hawaii legislature has responded with a proposal to afford marriage-like benefits to same-sex 
couples, but will retain the legislative power to limit the licensure of marriage to opposite sex 
couples only. See generally Kohm, supra note 23. 
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riage-Hawaii stands alone?9 Because substantive due process claims in-
voke fundamental rights to privacy, marriage and intimate association, 
same-sex marriage proponents routinely use due process arguments to 
challenge the boundaries of marriage. The concept of due process has 
evolved over the twentieth century, and it is of critical necessity to deter-
mine its meaning today. 
ill. WHAT IS DUE PROCESS IN 1998? 
Over the two centuries of American government, due process has been 
divided into two components: procedural and substantive. Procedural due 
process refers to citizens rights to have notice and a hearing of his or her 
grievances before government intervention or interference abridges the indi-
vidual's firmly established rights.40 Substantive due process rights refer to 
more comprehensive and subjective perspectives of liberty and have 
largely become based in privacy rights. 41 
The essence of due process safeguards has always been to protect indi-
vidual liberty against government action.42 The concepts used in Loving 
are being used today to argue that marriage is a fundamental right that can-
not be denied based on gender, just as Loving pronounced that liberty in 
marriage cannot be denied because of race. 
The central problem in making the Loving analogy to same-sex mar-
riage petitions is that race is afforded the strictest scrutiny for constitu-
tional protection, while gender or sex is not and has never been afforded 
the strictest scrutiny under the federal constitution.43 Rather, gender is af-
forded a heightened level of scrutiny, an intermediate level of review be-
tween the rational basis test and the compelling state interest standard.44 
This standard provides that any restriction based on sex must be substan-
39. For a discussion of the uniqueness of the State of Hawaii as the situs for a same-sex 
marriage action, see Coolidge, supra note 21. 
40. See LAWRENCE TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 682-83 (1988). 
41. See Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977). and Ira C. Lupu, Untangling the 
Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REV. 981, 1017 (demonstrating that Moore is 
an especially dramatic indication of the rebirth of substantive due process doctrine as a preferred 
method of analyzing privacy cases). 
42. Professor Lynn D. Wardle of Brigham Young University has given an overview of due 
process safeguards in the context of Loving. Wardle, The Meaning of Loving, supra note II. 
43. Suspect classifications are generally those which discriminate on the basis of race, 
alienage, or national otigin, and receive strict scrutiny. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr. Inc., 473 
u.s. 432, 440-41 (1985). 
44. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (a landmark sex discrimination case 
recognizing some sort of intermediate level of scrutiny for gender based classifications). See infra 
notes 90 and 102. 
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tially related to an important governmental objective.45 This is important in 
beginning to understand that Baehr is clearly not analogous to Loving.46 
To justify its decision, the Court in Loving added to the wealth of judi-
cial support for the institution of marriage in the context of liberty that 
holds this nation together. After citing to the landmark cases of Skinner v. 
Oklahoma47 and Maynard v. Hil/,48 the Loving Court emphatically stated: 
To deny this fundamental freedom on so unsupportable a 
basis as the racial classifications embodied in these statutes, 
classifications so directly subversive of the principle of equality 
at the heart of the Fourteenth Amendment, is surely to de-
prive all the State's citizens of liberty without due process of 
law. The Fourteenth Amendment requires that the freedom of 
choice to marry not be restricted by invidious racial discrimi-
nations. Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not 
marry, a person of another race resides with the individual 
and cannot be infringed by the State.49 
Liberty inherent in the choice to marry cannot be proscribed based on 
race. Martin Luther King, Jr. articulated the standard of liberty set for 
America by Jefferson and affirmed by Lincoln in the Emancipation Procla-
mation. 50 The standard for liberty was set long ago and was doc-
45. Craig, 429 U.S. at 197. 
46. See also Wardle, A Critical Analysis, supra note II at 75-87, where Professor Wardle 
discusses the fact that race and homosexual behavior are not equivalent legal categories in the section 
entitled "Why the Loving Analogy Fails." 
The underlying meaning of the term "sex" as used in Baehr is sexual preference. The 
classification of sexual preference has never been afforded any heightened scrutiny whatsoever, but 
merely calls for the rational basis test. This concept is explained further in Section IV. 
47. 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942). Loving v. Virginia stated that "[m]arriage is one of basic civil 
rights of man, fundamental to our very existence and survival." 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) (citing 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942)). 
48. 125 U.S. 190 (1888). 
49. 388 U.S. at 12. These are the last comments the Court makes before ultimately ordering 
that the convictions of the parties be reversed. /d. 
50. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., A TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF 
MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., 14-15 (James M. Washington ed. 1986). More specifically, King stated: 
I never intend to adjust myself to the tragic effects of the methods of physical violence 
and to tragic militarism. I call upon you to be maladjusted to such things. I call upon you 
to be as maladjusted as Amos who in the midst of the injustices of his day cried out in 
words that echo across the generation, "Let judgment run down like waters and 
righteousness like a mighty stream." As maladjusted as Abraham Lincoln who had the 
vision to see that this nation could not exist half slave and half free. As maladjusted as 
Jefferson, who in the midst of an age amazingly adjusted to slavery could cry out, "All 
men are created equal and are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights 
and that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness." As maladjusted as 
Jesus of Nazareth who dreamed a dream of the fatherhood of God and the brotherhood 
of man. God grant that we will be so maladjusted that we will be able to go out and 
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umented in the early history of this nation, but the Civil Rights Movement 
illustrated the fact that we as a nation were not living that standard. It was 
not the standard that needed updating. It was man's need to conform to the 
standard.5I 
In the same vein, we need to review, now thirty years later, the stan-
dard of marriage as exclusively between a man and a woman. Should such 
a model or pattern continue to be the standard? Or is that standard errant, 
having evolved? Or are we simply having difficulty living up to that stan-
dard? A contemporary analysis of due process is welcomed to help deter-
mine whether the standard of liberty itself is evolving. 
The most current Supreme Court case focusing its decision and ratio-
nale on due process is Washington v. Glucksberg, 52 which is supported by 
a host of family law cases. 53 Glucksberg was the Compassion in Dying54 
case that was ultimately heard by the Court in January of 1997 with a com-
panion case, Vacco v. Quill. 55 Glucksberg focused primarily on due pro-
cess as it extends to a liberty interest in the right to die. The plaintiffs in 
the original case were a non-profit organization called Compassion in Dy-
ing, Dr. Harold Glucksberg, three of his colleagues, and three terminally ill 
patients (who died before the final outcome of the case). 56 They brought 
the action against the State of Washington for a declaratory judgment re-
garding the constitutionality of the state's ban on assisted suicide as a vio-
lation of liberty and the Due Process Clause. 57 
"The plaintiffs asserted the existence of a liberty interest protected by 
the Fourteenth Amendment which extends to a personal choice by a men-
tally competent, terminally ill adult to commit physician assisted sui-
/d. 
change our world and our civilization. And then we will be able to move from the bleak 
and desolate midnight of man's inhumanity to man to the bright and glittering daybreak 
of freedom and justice. 
51. Cal Thomas, Bill Clinton's Evolutionary Morals, THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Nov. 13, 1997, 
at B II (referring to the fact that Jefferson owned slaves and illustrating the fact that his actions do 
not match the liberty standards he drafted for the new nation). 
52. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). 
53. The opinion and citations in G/ucksberg appear to be a review of classic constitutional 
family law cases, including Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I (1967), Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 
U.S. 833 (1992), Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977), Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 
535 (1942), Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923), Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 
(1925), Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt v. Baird, 905 U.S. 438 (1972), 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See G/ucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267, 2271 n.19. 
54. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). The en bane Court 
of Appeals emphasized Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), and 
Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. Of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). 
55. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997). Vacca dealt chiefly with the equal protection claims presented 
by assisted suicide proponents. 
56. Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F. Supp. 1454 (W.D. Wash. 1994). 
57. /d. See also 117 S. Ct. at 2258. 
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cide."58 After the district court agreed that the Washington statute did in-
deed violate the Due Process Clause, a panel for the Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit reversed. 59 Upon rehearing en bane, the Ninth Circuit 
reversed the panel's decision, affirming the District Court. 60 
The State of Washington appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, asking the Court to consider whether liberty includes the right to 
suicide and, derivatively, assisted suicide.61 The resulting opinion is the 
most current constitutional description of the use and rationale of due pro-
cess in the law today. In a very simple and quite traditional due process 
analysis, the Supreme Court concluded in a unanimous decision that there 
is no liberty interest in a right to die, reversing the decision of the en bane 
Court of Appeals.62 "[O]ur decisions lead us to conclude that the asserted 
'right' to assistance in committing suicide is not a fundamental liberty in-
terest protected by the Due Process Clause."63 This request to find a funda-
mental right in assisted suicide is strikingly similar to that presented by the 
same-sex marriage proponents who are asking for state intervention to con-
sider whether liberty includes the right to same-sex marriage. In what was 
possibly the most closely watched case of 1997, the legal arguments in 
Glucksberg focused on the Due Process Clause. 
The Justices in Glucksberg used a two-pronged analysis to examine 
the asserted liberty interest.64 The respondents, Dr. Glucksberg, his col-
leagues, and Compassion in Dying, relied on Casey (which gave the Court 
the opportunity to further clarify the parameters of that decision) and as-
serted that a personal choice to commit physician assisted suicide was pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 65 The 
Supreme Court of the United States was not persuaded. The Court said: 
We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining 
our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. In almost 
every State-indeed, in almost every western democracy-it is 
a crime to assist a suicide. The States' assisted suicide bans 
are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding expressions 
of the States' commitment to the protection and preservation 
of all human life.66 
58. 117 S. Ct. at 2261 (quoting Compassion in Dying, 850 F. Supp. at 1459). 
59. Compassion in Dying v. Washinglon, 49 F.3d 586 (9th Cir. 1995). 
60. Compassion in Dying v. Washinglon, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996). 
61. Washinglon v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2261-62 (1997). 
62. /d. at 2271, 2275. 
63. Id. at 2271. 
64. /d. at 2262-75. 
65. /d. 
66. /d. at 2262-63 (citations omitted). 
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The Court emphasized that condemnation of the inferred conduct (sui-
cide or assisted suicide) is a "consistent and enduring theme[] of our philo-
sophical, legal and cultural heritages. "67 The Court explained its use of a 
two pronged analysis early in the opinion. 
First, the Court has regularly observed that the Clause specially pro-
tects those fundamental rights and liberties which are deeply rooted in this 
Nation's history and tradition.68 It gave for example, Moore v. East Cleve-
land, a case about family limitations on residence including extended fam-
ily (a grandmother). 69 In that case the Court struck down a zoning ordi-
nance which prohibited extended family from being part of the definition 
of family in the term "single family dwelling."70 The Court found such a 
restriction to be a violation of substantive due process protections,71 noting 
the importance of a careful respect for the teachings of history.72 Applying 
this concept to Glucksberg, the Court restated the longstanding history of 
condemnation (and criminalization) of suicide and assisting in suicide, de-
claring that such conduct is clearly not in line with deeply rooted history 
and tradition.73 
Second, the Court required a careful description of the asserted funda-
mental liberty interest. 74 The Court gave as an example Reno v. Flores, 
where the Court stated "the Fourteenth Amendment 'forbids the govern-
ment to infringe ... "fundamental" liberty interests at all, no matter what 
process is provided, unless the infringement is narrowly tailored to serve a 
compelling state interest.' ,7., The Court explained the need for this careful 
description: 
In our view, however, the development of this Court's substan-
tive due process jurisprudence, described briefly above, has 
been a process whereby the outlines of the liberty specially 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment-never fully clari-
fied, to be sure, and perhaps not capable of being fully clari-
fied-have at least been carefully refined by concrete examples 
involving fundamental rights found to be deeply rooted in our 
legal tradition. This approach tends to rein in the subjective 
elements that are necessarily present in due process judicial 
reviews. In addition, by establishing a threshold require-
67. /d. at 2263. 
68. /d. at 2268. 
69. 431 U.S. 494 (1977). 
70. /d. at 506. 
71. /d. 
72. /d. at 503-504 (explaining that constitutional recognition extends to the tradition of 
grandparents sharing a household with parents and children). 
73. 117 S. Ct. at 2269. 
74. !d. at 2268. 
75. /d. (quoting Reno, 507 U.S. at 302 (1993)). 
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ment-that a challenged state action implicate a fundamental 
right-before requiring more than a reasonable relation to a 
legitimate state interest to justify the action, it avoids the need 
for complex balancing of competing interests in every case.76 
265 
In language emphasizing that the Court was indeed looking for a clear de-
scription of the asserted right, it found there was no clear description of the 
asserted liberty interest. 77 
Turning to the claim at issue here, the Court of Appeals 
stated that "(p]roperly analyzed, the first issue to be resolved 
is whether there is a liberty interest in determining the time 
and manner of one's death," or, in other words, "[i]s there a 
right to die?," ... and "the liberty to shape death." As noted 
above, we have a tradition of carefully formulating the interest 
at stake in substantive-due-process cases. 78 
The Court's tradition of careful formulation of the liberty interest was not 
met. It found that there was no clear description of a constitutional right to 
die. More particularly, the Court made a very clear distinction between 
competent rejection of life support assistance and a right to commit suicide 
with another's assistance.79 
Loving, by contrast, had no concern over the careful description of 
interracial marriage because nothing about Loving was contrary to history, 
nor did such an assertion require any new clear description of marriage. 80 
There have been many attempts to make Loving apply to a range of mar-
riage regulations, 81 but none of those endeavors have prevailed. The analy-
sis of the due process claims presented in Baehr is clearer in the light 
Glucksberg sheds on asserted liberty interests. 
IV. THE ISSUES PRESENTED 
The issues presented by Baehr are: (1) whether a fundamental right to 
marry a person of the same-sex exists, or (2) whether a fundamental right 
to state recognition and protection of same-sex unions that the partners 
76. /d. 
77. !d. at 2270. 
78. /d. at 2268-69 (citations omitted). 
79. /d. at 2270. The "clear description" that the Court requires carries a generalization that 
the concept must be implicitly based in history. 
80. 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967). 
81. For example, the Loving analogy has been applied to state regulation prohibiting 
polygamy, Potter v. Murray, 760 F.2d 1065 (lOth Cir. 1985), and before Baehr to the different sexes 
requirement in Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). See generally Wardle, A Critical 
Analysis, supra note 11. See also Kohm, supra note 23, at 277-300. 
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consider to be marriages exists when the federal constitution requires that 
liberty cannot be infringed upon without the due process of law.82 
There is no express provision in the United States Constitution pro-
tecting same-sex marriage. Indeed, there is no constitutional provision pro-
tecting marriage in any form. Marriage is above and beyond the Bill of 
Rights. 83 Moreover, legislatures can govern marriage without constitu-
tional violations. 84 Same-sex marriage proponents rely on this fact, arguing 
that state regulations limiting marriage to a legally sanctioned union be-
tween a man and a woman deprives them of that fundamental right. And as 
has been discussed, constitutional case law has held that marriage is a fun-
damental right and a protected liberty interest. 85 Therefore, do laws that 
refuse to recognize a fundamental right infringe on the Fourteenth Amend-
ment guarantee that no state may deprive any person of liberty without due 
process of law? The Court stated in Glucksberg: 
The Due Process Clause guarantees more than fair pro-
cess, and the "liberty" it protects includes more than the ab-
sence of physical restraint. The Clause also provides height-
ened protection against government interference with certain 
fundamental rights and liberty interests. In a long line of 
cases, we have held that, in addition to the specific freedoms 
protected by the Bill of Rights, the liberty specially protected 
by the Due Process Clause includes the rights to marry, Lov-
ing v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); to have children, Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); to direct the education and 
upbringing of one's children, Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); to mar-
ital privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); to 
use contraception, Id. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); 
82. Memorandum from John Tuskey, Senior Research Counsel, The American Center for Law 
and Justice (ACU Memorandum) to Jay Sekulow, Chief Counsel, The American Center for Law and 
Justice 10 (July 23, 1997) (on file with author). The ACU is a public interest law finn dedicated 
to preserving religious freedom. The purpose of this memo was to brief the foUowing question: "Can 
the proposed amendment to the Hawaii Constitution reserving to the legislature the power to limit 
marriage to opposite sex couples survive a chaUenge under the Due Process and Equal Protection 
Clauses of the United States Constitution?" Jd. at 1. 
83. Marriage, and the concept of the union of two individuals in a meaningful lifetime 
relationship, was originaUy designed by a Supreme Being before codification of the law of marriage. 
84. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 207-208 (1888). See also Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 
393 (1975) (upholding state statutory requirements for residency in filing for divorce, and recognizing 
a state interest in upholding its own requirements for marriage and divorce); Simms v. Simms, 175 
U.S. 162, 167 (1899) ("The whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife ... belongs 
to the laws of the State, and not the laws of the United States."). 
85. Loving, 388 U.S. at 11-12; Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (requiring less 
burdensome state enforcement than prohibiting the marriage of a father who had not paid child 
support). 
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to bodily integrity, Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952), 
and to abortion, Casey, supra.86 
267 
With that background, the Court in Glucksberg rejected the asserted right, 
applying the standard requiring a rational relation to a legitimate govern-
ment purpose in the substantive due process analysis. 87 The Court stated: 
We have also assumed, and strongly suggested, that the Due 
Process Clause protects the traditional right to refuse un-
wanted lifesaving medical treatment. 
But we ''ha[ve] always been reluctant to expand the con-
cept of substantive due process because guideposts for respon-
sible decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and 
open-ended." By extending constitutional protection to an as-
serted right or liberty interest, we, to a great extent, place the 
matter outside the arena of public debate and legislative ac-
tion. We must therefore "exercise the utmost care whenever 
we are asked to break new ground in this field," lest the liberty 
protected by the Due Process Clause be subtly transferred into 
the policy preferences ofthe members of this Court.88 
In applying this approach of history and a careful description, the Court 
concluded: 
[W]e are confronted with a consistent and a most universal 
tradition that has long rejected the asserted right and contin-
ues explicitly to reject it today .... To hold for respondents, we 
would have to reverse centuries of legal doctrine and practice, 
and strike down the considered policy choice of almost every 
State.89 
The Court found no fundamental right to die. Therefore, the least 
amount of scrutiny was applied to the claim in the absence of a fundamen-
tal right to die.90 Once the Court concluded that the asserted liberty was not 
86. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267. Note the extensive display and rich application of fatnily 
law cases to what may not seem like a fatnily law case. 
87. /d. at 2271. 
88. /d. at 2267-68 (citations omitted). 
89. /d. at 2269. 
90. An intennediate level of constitutional scrutiny exists for gender based classifications. See 
infra note 103. Furthennore, a federal court has previously ruled that sexual behavior is not a 
category against which the United States as an employer cannot discriminate, as such behavior has 
never been afforded a heightened standard of review. High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security 
Clearance Office, 895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990). Sexual behavior has yet to rise to the 
heightened middle-tier scrutiny of gender, see Wardle, supra note 11, A Critical Analysis, at 83, and 
"certainly will not rise to be afforded the strictest scrutiny now enjoyed only by the classifications 
of race, alienage and national origin." Kohm, supra note 23, at 319. 
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a fundamental right, government regulation of the asserted liberty interest 
need only be rationally related to legitimate government interests.91 
Baehr asserts a fundamental right to same-sex marriage. Because 
same-sex marriage is not deeply rooted in history and tradition and re-
quires a new description, a new fundamental right must be recognized. 
The applicant couples in Baehr have admitted that they were asking the 
court to recognize a new fundamental right. 92 
What lurks behind the analysis are those subjective elements that are 
necessarily present in due process judicial review. 93 The Court in 
Glucksberg implied that some personal decisions may be identified and 
explicitly recognized by the Court as deeply rooted in this nation's history 
and tradition, and which may therefore lead to recognition of new funda-
mental rights, citing Roe v. Wade and Casey.94 Further explaining this po-
sition, the Court clarified its previous language in Casey, which effectively 
back-peddled from a strict scrutiny application to the abortion right, to an 
undue burden standard of review to any regulation on the right to abor-
tion.95 The use of Casey allowed the Court to state that previously dis-
cerned fundamental rights found in autonomy "do[] not warrant the sweep-
ing conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal decisions 
are so protected."96 This may appear to give the Court latitude to swing 
either way on Baehr. In determining what the petitioners in Baehr must 
demonstrate to support the recognition of a new fundamental right, how-
91. 117 S. Ct. 2258, 227I (1997). 
92. 852 P.2d 44, 57 (Haw. I993). 
93. 117 S. Ct. at 2268. 
94. /d. at 2270 (citing Roe, 4IO U.S. I I3 (1973) (finding a fundamental right to abortion) 
and Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (allowing state regulated limitations on that fundamental right)). 
95. I I 7 S. Ct. at 2271. The Glucksberg opinion reads: 
Similarly, respondents emphasize the statement in Casey that: 
"At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, 
of the universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these matters could not 
define the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State." 
Citing Casey at 851. Brief for Respondents 12. By choosing this language, the Court's 
opinion in Casey described, in a general way and in light of our prior cases, those 
personal activities and decisions that this Court has identified as so deeply rooted in our 
history and tradition, or so fundamental to our concept of constitutionally ordered liberty, 
that they are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. The opinion moved from the 
recognition that liberty necessarily includes freedom of conscience and belief about 
ultimate consideration to the observation that "though the abortion decision may originate 
within the zone of conscience and belief, it is more than a philosophic exercise." Casey, 
505 U.S. at 852, I 12 S. Ct. at 2807 (emphasis added). That many of the rights and 
liberties protected by the Due Process Clause sound in personal autonomy does not 
warrant the sweeping conclusion that any and all important, intimate, and personal 
decisions are so protected, San Antonio Independent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 4I I U.S. 
I, 33-35, 93 S. Ct. I278, I296-I298, 36 L.Ed.2d I6 (1973), and Casey did not suggest 
otherwise. 
96. /d. 
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ever, very little of this subjective element remains.97 Baehr asks for judi-
cial discernment and recognition of that new fundamental right. 
V. WHAT IS NECESSARY TO SUP PORT THE RECOGNITION OF A 
NEW FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT? 
This analysis will be referred to as the implicit/explicit approach. The 
implicit element refers to the requirement that the right be deeply rooted in 
history and tradition. The explicit element refers to the necessity of a clear 
description of the asserted fundamental liberty interest. Using this im-
plicit/explicit approach laid out in Glucksberg, it is clear that Baehr would 
not have the solid constitutional foundation that Loving enjoys under this 
approach. 
The arguments for a fundamental right to inter-racial marriage begin 
with the implicit prong that a right to marry is fundamental, and protection 
of this right is deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. The ex-
plicit prong lies in the fact that race is expressly afforded the strictest scru-
tiny, and has been carefully articulated by statute and case law in the past. 
These premises lead to the natural conclusion that marriage cannot be pro-
hibited based on race. This is Loving in a nutshell. 
The arguments for a fundamental right to same-sex marriage would 
begin with the implicit assumption that the right to marry is fundamental, 
based in privacy, liberty and autonomy (Casey, Roe, and Loving would be 
cited), and deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. The explicit 
prong would need to do one of three things: either (a) show there is a care-
ful description of the asserted liberty (i.e. same-sex marriage would be rec-
ognized as a careful description rather than an anathema), (b) articulate a 
careful description of marriage as not based on the parties different sexes, 
or (c) show that sex or gender is an expressly forbidden discrimination and 
must be afforded the strictest scrutiny.98 Thus, if any one of these three 
explicit alternatives can be met, there is no need for a new fundamental 
right. These are the strengths of the argument, and they are not compelling. 
97. It should be noted that an exception to the rule based on the "subjective elements'' would 
be required for drawing an analogy between Loving and Baehr, and thus between race and gender. 
Because the concept of marriage is defined by the requirement that parties be of different sexes, 
marriage would need to be defined as a fundamental right, regardless of sexual preference, which 
would then also be a landmark in gender law as well. This is unlikely in light of Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), High Tech Gays v. Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office, 
895 F.2d 563, 573 (9th Cir. 1990}, and even Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620 (1996). See generally 
Richard F. Duncan, Wigstock and the Kulturkampf Supreme Court Storytelling, The Culture War, 
and Romer v. Evans, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 345 (1997). 
98. This is the most pragmatic argument in the Hawaii litigation, based on Hawaii's explicit 
delineation that discrimination based on sex is constitutionally forbidden, and thus afforded the 
strictest scrutiny by the Court of that State. 
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The weaknesses of the argument ultimately disable the reasoning and 
rationale for same-sex marriage. First, under the implicit prong, same-sex 
marriage was not contemplated in history and tradition and is not a rela-
tionship deeply rooted in our nation's history and tradition. This gravely 
weakens the fundamental right premise. The right to marry currently does 
not encompass same-sex marriage, and the concept of marriage carries an 
implicit assumption that marriage can only occur between a man and a 
woman99 Thus, a same-sex union would be rendered a non-marriage. 100 
Secondly, under the explicit prong, sex (or gender) 101 is not afforded 
the strictest scrutiny under federal constitutional law, but rather some mid-
dle level of heightened scrutiny at best. 102 If sexual orientation, instead of 
gender, is the gauge, a more fatal result is likely because sexual orientation 
has yet to rise to the middle tier of scrutiny that gender enjoys. 103 Then co-
mes the hurdle of carefully describing the asserted right. There would need 
to be some description of the right to not be discriminated against based on 
gender, sex, sexual orientation or sexual preference in choosing a marriage 
partner. This would have to be combined with a description of this new 
concept of marriage. 
99. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499, 500 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971) (concluding that 
"all [definitions] recognize that [marriage] is a union or contract between a man and a woman."). 
When any marriage is missing a basic requirement, e.g. of suitable age, unrelated by blood, one at 
a time, of different sexes, it is termed a "non-marriage." 
100. !d. A sex change operation that took place after the marriage did not change the fact that 
parties of the same sex cannot complete a marital union by nature, and such is determined at the 
time of the marriage agreement, not after. /d. 
lO I. Because the Hawaii State Constitution prohibits discrimination based on sex, the 
petitioners in Baehr use sex interchangeably with gender and use both terms as substitutes for 
sexual behavior, to persuade the court that each category is protected in Hawaii by the word "sex" 
in the Hawaii Constitution. Therefore, any "sex discrimination argument only survives if sexual 
behavior is interpreted to mean sex." Kohm, supra note 23, at 319. "Gender" cannot equal 
homosexual behavior. See also Richard F. Duncan, The Narrow and Shallow Bite of Romer and the 
Eminent Rationality of Dual-Gender Marriage: A (Partial) Response to Professor Koppelman, 6 
WM. & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS J. 147, 155-164 (1998). 
102. I refer to the "middle-level scrutiny" standard from Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976), 
where the court settled on an "intermediate" level of scrutiny for gender based classifications. The 
opinion does not explicitly announce the application of a new standard different from the "strict 
scrutiny" test, which is reserved for fundamental rights and suspect classes, or from the traditional 
"mere rationality" test. 
103. /d. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), confums this, stating also that fundamental 
rights are only those deeply rooted in this nation's history and tradition. (Bowers also cites Moore 
v. East Cleveland extensively.) The Bowers majority clearly stated their reluctance to recognize new 
rights as well: 
The Court is most vulnerable and it comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with 
judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or 
design of the Constitution .... There should be, therefore, great resistance to expand the 
substantive reach of [the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], 
particularly if it requires redefining the category of rights deemed to be fundarnental. 
478 U.S. at 197. 
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Asking the government to recognize a right neither contemplated in 
our nation's history or tradition, nor clearly described (as something other 
than a state sanctioned domestic partnership) leaves the argument in ruin, 
thus requiring more creativity than the Court can supply. With both the 
implicit and explicit prongs unsatisfied, states would be required to apply 
the traditional "mere rationality" test to any restrictions placed on mar-
riage. That is indeed what happened to the right to die argument in 
Glucksberg. The same result may befall the right to same-sex marriage 
argument in Baehr, should the case ever reach the Supreme Court. 
Some might suggest that Justice Souter's concurrence in the right-to-
die cases could function as an opening for same-sex marriage rights in the 
future. In his concurring opinion to Glucksberg, Justice Souter seemed to 
suggest that he would embrace a substantive due process analysis that ex-
amines whether the state statute in question sets up an arbitrary imposition 
or purposeless restraint. 104 Relying chiefly on Justice Harlan's dissent in 
Poe v. Ullman, 105 Souter distinguished his con-currence from the Court's 
plurality opinion which clearly desired to block potential exploitation of 
the Due Process Clause. 106 It is over this very point that the Court empha-
sized the development of this Court's substantive due process 
jurisprudence as that which has at least been carefully refined by examples 
deeply rooted in the nation's history and legal tradition. 107 As the Court 
attempted to rein in the subjective elements, 108 Justice Souter wanted to 
supply modem justification for substantive due process review from 
Harlan's dissent in Poe. 109 
The opinion of the Court noted that they did rely on Justice Harlan's 
dissent from Poe in the Casey decision. 110 Specifically, the opinion stated, 
"but, as Flores demonstrates, we did not in so doing jettison our estab-
104. 117 S. Ct. at 2275 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 543 (1961) (Harlan, J., 
dissenting)). 
105. 367 U.S. 497 (1961). In Poe, a physician and two married couples challenged 
Connecticut's anti-contraception laws. The Court ruled that the case was not one that presented a 
"clear threat of prosecution," and therefore refused to hear the case on appeal. Justice Harlan 
dissented, contending that the Connecticut statute violated the due process interest in marital privacy. 
/d. Harlan later wrote a simple concurrence in the Griswold case (being somewhat vindicated by the 
Court's ruling in favor of marital privacy) where he developed the "ordered liberty approach." 381 
u.s. 479, 496 (1965). 
106. 117 S. Ct. at 2262 (referring to "longstanding expressions"), 2268 (referring to "our 
established method"), 2271 (referring to the fact that this due process assertion does not warrant a 
"sweeping conclusion"), 2277 (referring to a strong "resistance"). 
107. /d. at 2268. 
108. /d. 
109. /d. at 2277. See also id. at 2268 n.l7 (where the Justices remind Justice Souter that Poe 
was not even cited in Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292 (1993)). Nor was it cited in Cruzan v. Director, 
Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 278-79 (1990), the most heavily cited authority in the 
Glucksberg opinion, where the court determined in Cruzan that rights "so rooted in history, tradition, 
and practice ... require special protection under the Fourteenth Amendment." Cruzan, at 278-279. 
110. 117 S. Ct. at 2268 n.17 (citing 505 U.S. at 848-850). 
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lished approach. Indeed, to read such a radical move into the Court's opin-
ion in Casey would seem to fly in the face of that opinion's emphasis on 
stare decisis."111 Recognizing the potential for abuse of the subjective ele-
ments using Casey and Poe, the Court distinguished its opinion in 
Glucksberg. 
With a lengthy concurrence embodying a heavy emphasis on the facts 
presented by the respondent in Glucksberg, Justice Souter laid out a case 
for confining the hastening of death to a physician-assisted occurrence 
only that would indeed be under the imposition of reasonable regulation by 
the state. 112 Strengthening this position with the concept that due process 
has historically protected unremunerated rights, 113 Souter emphasized that 
In my judgment, the importance of the individual interest 
here, as within that class of "certain interests" demanding 
careful scrutiny of the State's contrary claim cannot be gain-
said. Whether that interest might in some circumstances, or at 
some time, be seen as "fundamental" to the degree entitled to 
prevail is not, however, a conclusion that I need draw here, for 
I am satisfied that the State's interests described in the follow-
ing section are sufficiently serious to defeat the present claim 
that its law is arbitrary or purposeless. 114 
The Court's unanimous opinion, however, supports the notion that if 
Souter favors same-sex marriage rights in a future case, he will be alone in 
his use of a due process argument to buttress such a claim because of the 
Court's clearly stated resistance to the expansion of fundamental liberty 
interests. 115 The holdings of the right-to-die cases present a due process 
argument against same-sex marriage. 
Further analysis of the arguments can be done in light of Shahar v. 
Bowers116and Turner v. Safley. 117 Some constitutional law theorists may 
Ill. /d. (citing 505 U.S. at 854-869). 
112. /d. at 2286-88. Souter uses an analogy to Roe, 410 U.S. 113. "Like the decision to 
commit suicide, the decision to abort potential life can be made irresponsibly and under the influence 
of others, and yet the Court has held in the abortion cases that physicians are fit assistants." 117 S. 
Ct. at 2288. 
113. /d. at 2288. 
114. /d. at 2290 (citations omitted). Justice Souter's concurrence in Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 
2293, 2302, likewise acquiesces to the lack of arbitrariness of the opinion under the due process 
standard. 
Souter often used phrases in both the Vacco and the Glucksberg concurrences such as "at this 
time," Vacco, 117 S. Ct. at 2302, and "might in some circumstances, or at some time," Glucksberg, 
117 S. Ct. at 2290. Such phrases generally give cause for future hope on the part of the losing 
parties. Regardless, Souter's concurrence in Glucksberg might suggest that any argument in favor 
of same-sex marriage would have a stronger base in Casey. Otherwise, Glucksberg has little to 
nothing to offer claims to marriage by same-sex parties, even in Souter's estimation. 
115. 117 S. Ct. at 2268, 2271. 
116. 70 F.3d 1218 (lith Cir. 1995), vacated, 78 F.3d 499 (11th Cir. 1996), and reh' g en 
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argue that Shahar' s panel decision evidences some support for the liberty 
argument sketched above, based in recognition of the right to intimate as-
sociation. 118 Shahar involved the withdrawal of an employment offer by 
the State Attorney General's office upon it learning of plaintiff's plan to 
participate in a marriage-like ceremony with her lesbian lover, Green-
field. 119 The argument articulates a constitutional protection for same-sex 
marriages. "Where intimacy and personal identity are so closely inter-
twined ... between Shahar and Greenfield, the core values of the intimate 
association right are at stake."120 Another well reasoned argument sounds 
like this: 
Despite the panel's decision in Shahar, it is unlikely for 
two reasons that courts will decide that a fundamental right to 
same-sex marriage exists. First, all the Supreme Court's cases 
involving the fundamental right to marry have involved mar-
riages between men and women. Second, the Supreme Court's 
recent decision in Glucksberg signals a retreat from Casey's 
broad language concerning liberty and the limits of govern-
ment action. Glucksberg emphasized the importance of exam-
ining our nation's history and tradition in determining 
fundamental rights. Glucksberg also emphasized that the 
Court would view asserted rights claims specifically rather 
than as part of some general right to privacy or autonomy. The 
asserted right to marry a person of the same sex has no basis 
in this nation's history and tradition. Moreover, even if the 
Due Process Clause prevents states from prohibiting homosex-
uals from forming marriage-like unions, the clause does not 
require states to recognize those unions by giving them legal 
recognition and benefits. 121 
Turner v. Safle/ 22 demonstrated that other attributes of marriage 
deemed important by the Supreme Court outweigh any interest a state 
would have in promoting procreation by prohibiting same-gender unions. 
With a litany of critical characteristics that remain in marriage, aside from 
the physical and biological aspects of that relationship, the Court declared 
that a state could not withhold from an inmate the right to marry. 123 On the 
other hand, the Court has also historically tied the fundamental right to 
bane, 114 F.3d 1097 (lith Cir. 1997). 
117. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
118. 114 F.3d 1097. 
119. 70 F.3d at 1220. 
120. /d. at 1229. 
121. ACU Memorandum, supra note 82, at 15 (citations omitted). 
122. 482 U.S. 78 (1987). 
123. /d. 
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marriage to the activities associated with procreating and raising chil-
dren.124 It remains a fact that only reproductive cells from heterosexual 
couples can accomplish procreation. 
By tying the right to marriage to the right to procreate, the 
Court's right to marry cases underscore the context in which 
they arise-in cases involving the union of men and women. 
Nothing in those cases suggests that the Court was contem-
plating any right to same-sex marriage. To draw support for 
same-sex marriage from those cases would be to rip those 
cases from their factual context.125 
The Glucksberg opinion demonstrated that the Supreme Court will 
require litigants to show that the alleged right they assert, which will have 
to be described with specificity, is deeply rooted in our nation's legal his-
tory and tradition. Glucksberg indicated that the Supreme Court has an 
outright and formidable reluctance to find a new fundamental right absent 
firm grounding in history and tradition, and a clear description of an as-
serted liberty interest. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND PROSPECTUS 
In American law there is no liberty interest in same-sex marriage. 
There is no violation of due process in regulating marriage as the union of 
a man and a woman. There is no fundamental right to marry another indi-
vidual of the same gender. The fundamental right to marry has always con-
templated unions between men and women. Other relationship formation 
has not been legally recognized as marriage, but in fact has been termed a 
non-marriage. 126 A potential Supreme Court opinion in Baehr might read 
something like this: 
We begin, as we do in all due process cases, by examining 
our Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices. In almost 
every State-indeed, in almost every westem democ-
racy-marriage implicitly is defined by and limited to a union 
between a man and a woman. The States' marriage regula-
124. Professor Wardle reviews these and other cases in his article, The Meaning of Loving, 
supra note 11. See e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (finding a liberty interest 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment which encompasses the right "to marry, establish a home, 
and bring up children."); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974) (recognizing 
fanilly life and procreation as liberties protected by due process); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 
479 (1965) (recognizing the right of married people to use contraceptives based in a liberty interest); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (protecting the fundamental freedom to procreate from 
state infringement). 
125. ACU Memorandum, supra note 82, at 18. 
126. Anonymous v. Anonymous, 325 N.Y.S.2d 499 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971). 
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tions are not innovations. Rather, they are longstanding ex-
pressions of the States' commitment to the protection and 
preservation ofthe institution of marriage. Moreover, the ma-
jority of States in this country have laws imposing some sort of 
criminal penalty on such requisite (homosexual) sexual con-
duct. (See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 373 (1989) The 
primary and most reliable indication of a national consensus is 
. . . the pattern of enacted laws.) Indeed, opposition to and 
denunciation of homosexuality-the physical basis for same 
sex marriage-are consistent and enduring themes of our 
philosophical, legal, and cultural heritages. 127 
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The importance of the implicit prong cannot be underestimated. 
Glucksberg illustrated the Supreme Court's reluctance to find new funda-
mental rights absent the firm grounding in history and tradition. Same-sex 
marriage proponents have made attempts to overcome apparent history and 
tradition with massaged history.128 Likewise, the importance of the explicit 
prong cannot be underestimated. There needs to be a careful articulation 
and description of the asserted liberty interest. The problem with a clear 
description of assisted suicide was in the necessity that the liberty specially 
protected by the Clause includes a right to commit suicide which, itself, 
includes a right to assistance in doing so. The problem with a clear de-
scription of same-sex marriage is that the right itself requires a right to 
sodomy and homosexual sexual activity within the carefully crafted de-
scription of the asserted liberty. As with assistance in suicide, these are not 
constitutionally protected privacy rights. 129 
The last hope for Baehr and same-sex marriage proponents in the 
quest for due process and liberty in same-sex marriage is the power of sub-
jective elements and judicial discretion that the Supreme Court used in 
Roe and in Casey and distinguished in Glucksberg. This would only be 
possible with some new existential or ontological view of marriage found 
by the Justices. Loving and Glucksberg have clearly given the standard for 
liberty and demonstrate the influence and power of clear legal views that 
the Justices hold. Baehr and same-sex marriage proponents envision soci-
etal and cultural approbation of homosexuality. They would like to accom-
plish this with the use of liberty and the Due Process Clause. But even a 
move from prohibition to tolerance of committed homosexual relationships 
does not, however, amount to an endorsement. Such approbation will be 
difficult, if not impossible, to gain. 
127. This is an adaptation of Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2262-63 (1997). Casey, Loving, 
Moore, Bowers and Glucksberg citations would be included. 
128. See Kohm, supra note 23, at 323-324. 
129. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). See also Duncan, supra note 101, at !54 
(emphasizing that Bowers is the law, and inferior courts are required to follow it). 
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Still today the brilliant truth and purity of Loving are undeniable and 
incorruptible. Liberty manifested itself, and due process protected Richard 
and Mildred Loving from further state interference in their marital union. 
Thirty years later, the historical case of Loving v. Virginia stands alone in 
its articulation of the primacy of marriage, and its wisdom and insight into 
racial concerns. Now in 1998, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment cannot be tortured to demand state intervention in recognizing 
and sanctioning a new marriage relationship between Ninia Baehr and 
Genora Dancel. Liberty manifests itself to protect against redefinition of 
the marital union. Baehr will not have the legacy that Loving enjoys, as 
liberty and due process assertions are beyond Baehr and the rights asserted 
in same-sex marriage claims. 
